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Introduction  
 
This report presents the results from the collection of background information, interviews 
with experts and stakeholders conducted in Milan and Naples in May 2013, and qualitative 
semi-structured interviews with migrants in these two regions of Italy.  
 
Section one provides an overview of Italy’s relatively recent emergence as a major receiver 
of labour immigration, along with policy responses and outcomes and recent legislative 
changes. The succeeding section details the various regularisations and other forms of 
amnesty since 1990, along with estimates of changed stocks of irregular migrants over time, 
and for the first time estimation of Italy’s irregularity rate over the last decade. 
 
The third section provides in the first instance a summary of the more important literature 
concerning labour market outcomes of regularisations in Italy. This is followed by a synopsis 
of the results of the 20 interviews conducted with immigrants in Milan and Naples. Some 
broad patterns are identified, along with tabular presentation of some major variables 
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concerning the responses. Four case studies are presented in some detail – each 
representing a fairly common pattern of interaction with the immigration legislative 
framework of Italy. 
 
The report concludes with some thoughts on the problematic of conducting large-scale 
surveys in Naples and Milan to establish the impact of regularisations on the labour market 
and on immigrants themselves. 
 
1. General context – migration history and policy 
 
Like many of its Mediterranean neighbours, Italy's migration history has been primarily as a 
sender of migrants, especially to the United States during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. In the late 1970s, this pattern shifted and Italy became a migrant-receiving 
country. The first positive balance between emigration and immigration (return immigration 
included) dates to 1973. Inflows started after the oil crisis of 1973, when the United 
Kingdom, Germany and, in particular, neighbouring France closed their borders to 
immigrants (Einaudi 2007). The geographical position of Italy makes it a transit and 
destination country for migrants fleeing political and economic crises in the region. In 
addition, migrants have been increasingly attracted by the growth of certain sectors in Italy's 
economy, although mainly in the informal sector (Reyneri 1998). The demographic decline 
and low fertility rate in Italy has also fuelled the country's need for foreign labour since the 
mid-1970s. While the government has primarily responded to the growth of the foreign 
population by enacting restrictive legislation, the country has also taken the lead in Europe in 
enacting regularisation programmes for migrants (Barbagli, Colombo et al. 2004). Manifold 
scholars have affirmed the nexus between regularisation and the increasing flow of irregular 
migrants in Italy; moreover, much of the immigrant population in Italy acquired their legal 
status through regularisation programmes. Between 1986 and 2009, the country legalised 
over 1.6 million migrants (1,661,291), a number surpassed only by the United States 
(Caritas/Migrantes 2013).  
 
Over the last decade, the number of foreigners legally residing in Italy has almost tripled, 
despite the economic crisis. However, much of this increase in recent years is attributable to 
foreign children born in Italy along with family reunification inflows. In 2012, minors 
accounted for 24.1% of the immigrant population and family reunification visas were 45% of 
new entries (Caritas/Migrantes 2013). On 1 January 2013, 4,387,721 resident foreigners 
(7.4% of the total population) were registered in Italy (Istat 2013). As regards non-EU 
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citizens, there were 3,764,236 people with residence permits, with Morocco, Albania and 
China the main countries of origin – see Table 1, below. Since 2008, a few nationalities have 
vastly increased their holding of residence permits – in particular, citizens of China, the 
Philippines, India, Moldova, Egypt, Bangladesh and Peru. Over this same timeframe, Italy 
has issued increasingly more long-term permits (both national and EU) such that 55% of 
permit holders are now with permanent residence. Table 2 shows the trend and top 10 
nationalities. Interestingly, Moldovans and Tunisians are under-represented in their holding 
of permanent residence permits, and Pakistanis and Senegalese replace them in the top 
ten.2 
Despite the overall trend of increasing stock of foreign residents, return flows and non-
renewed permits are also visible. In 2012, 180,000 permits expired without being renewed; 
in 2011, it was 263,000 – before the enactment of the law extending the employment search 
duration of permits from 6 to 12 months (Caritas/Migrantes 2013). First residence permits 
have considerably reduced in number, from just under 600,000 in 2010 to 250,000 in 2012 
(see Table 3). Moreover, by 2012 some 50% of first time permits were issued for family 
reasons, and only 27% for employment-related reasons. Also in 2012, for the first time the 
leading citizenship (with the highest growth in stocks) was Chinese, with Albanians and 
Moroccans at reduced levels. 
 
Table 1: Total valid residence permits at 31 December each year, principal nationalities, 
2008-2012 
Citizens 
of: 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% in 
2012 
Morocco 438,897 507,370 501,308 506,474 517,146 13.7% 
Albania 448,447 522,851 483,705 491,560 501,542 13.3% 
China 205,819 280,766 278,863 277,581 304,846 8.1% 
Ukraine 177,473 229,427 218,191 223,790 224,681 6.0% 
Philippines 118,316 137,300 138,359 152,406 158,956 4.2% 
India 101,870 145,186 144,791 145,172 150,877 4.0% 
Moldova 103,232 138,274 140,954 147,522 149,087 3.9% 
Egypt 83,051 99,547 108,524 117,174 124,629 3.3% 
Tunisia 101,659 118,030 116,504 122,633 122,438 3.2% 
Bangladesh 78,295 95,558 101,757 106,679 113,529 3.0% 
Total 3,035,573 3,587,653 3,525,586 3,638,301 3,774,613 100.0% 
                                                        
2
 It should not be forgotten that Romanians, numbering just under 1.1 million in 2012, remain the most numerous 
foreign population in Italy. As EU citizens, they are no longer counted as immigrants. 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 
Table 2: Total long-term residence permits at 31 December each year, principal nationalities, 
2008-2012 
Citizens 
of: 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% in 
2012 
Morocco 123,853 163,291 190,194 310,672 333,451 16.1% 
Albania 125,749 175,560 205,690 308,529 332,916 16.1% 
China  33,932 47,740 62,161 108,296 119,123 5.8% 
Ukraine 16,489 54,945 77,202 98,785 111,021 5.4% 
Philippines 29,136 38,500 46,780 72,075 78,964 3.8% 
India 24,181 35,905 45,405 73,345 78,699 3.8% 
Egypt 22,442 28,663 36,036 66,749 73,213 3.5% 
Bangladesh 20,806 28,677 35,183 56,348 61,408 3.0% 
Senegal 25,018 32,073 38,242 55,016 59,407 2.9% 
Pakistan 17,959 25,857 32,745 54,512 59,323 2.9% 
Total 716,217 1,006,541 1,223,729 1,893,735 2,070,333 100.0% 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Table 3: First residence permits issued, by reason, 2008-2012 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 % in 2012 
Family 76,764 75,153 180,391 141,403 119,745 48.5% 
Education 28,609 32,634 25,676 30,260 30,631 12.4% 
Employment 272,791 235,966 359,051 119,342 66,742 27.0% 
Other 172,062 163,080 24,870 40,078 29,642 12.0% 
Total 550,226 506,833 589,988 331,083 246,760 100.0% 
 Source: Eurostat 
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The regional distribution of resident foreigners is skewed towards the North and the Centre 
of Italy, where 86% reside. Specifically, 35% are in the North West, 27% in the North East, 
24% in the Centre and only 10% in the South (Istat 2013). More immigrants are in Lombardy 
than any other region (1.03 million). Moreover, the regional distribution of immigrants does 
not reflect the distribution of the Italian population, with the result that the ratio of immigrants 
to total population is much higher in the North – frequently exceeding 12% of the population. 
Figure 1 below shows immigrant/population ratios by commune of Italy, as of 1 January 
2013. 
 
Figure 1: Resident foreigners as a percentage of total population, by commune, on 1 
January 2013 
 
Source: Istat (2013) 
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Regular admission and stay system 
The only way of entering Italy ‘legally’ for a stay of more than 3 months is by benefiting from 
planned quotas of flow Decrees (detailed below) and having a visa issued by one of the 
Italian diplomatic posts abroad. Moreover, there are extra-quota channels ex art. 27 of the 
Consolidated Act on Immigration for high-skilled migrants as academics, artists and others, 
as well as holders of the EU Blue Card (since August 2012). The possible motivations which 
entitle migrants to a regular residence permit are: 
- business, religion, tourism and study (a limited number of study-permits can be 
converted into permits for work); 
- family reunification (when the sponsor fulfils requirements on income and 
accommodation); 
- asylum and international protection; and 
- seasonal and non-seasonal work (on the basis of quotas). 
 
As regards labour migration, Italy has moved from the absence of any kind of planning to the 
adoption of a yearly decision on the prospects of entries of migrants, according to the need 
of the labour market. According to Law No 39/1990 (known as the ‘Martelli law’), the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs shall each year issue a ‘flows Decree’ (decreto flussi) concerning the 
number of foreign workers who are allowed to enter the country the subsequent year. 
 
The current procedure regarding subordinate employees hired for a fixed or non-fixed period 
of time or non-EU foreigners residing abroad hired on a seasonal basis stipulates that the 
employer (Italian or foreigner legally residing in the country) has the duty to present himself 
to the appropriate Single Desk for Immigration. In cases where the employer knows the 
employee he wants to hire, he must make a request by name for a work permit (the 
documentation of a suitable housing accommodation has been removed by Legislative 
Decree No 76/2013), as well as the relevant ‘proposal for a residence permit’. Once the 
assessment is positive, the Single Desk issues the authorisation (nulla osta) to work, and 
transmits the documentation to the consular offices in the applicant’s country of residence. 
The latter, then, has up to six months to obtain the relevant visa to enter Italy. 
 
The duration of the residence permit is the same as that indicated on the entry visa and in 
any case not more than:  
- 6 months for seasonal work or 9 months in specific sectors requiring this extension;  
- 1 year if attending a course of study or a vocational training course; 
- 1 year for subordinate employment (fixed-term contract); and 
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- 2 years for subordinate employment (open-ended contract), self-employment and family 
reunification.  
 
Recent legal developments 
The current Italian legislation on migration is based on the systematic structure of the 
‘Consolidated Act of measures  governing  immigration  and  norms  on  the  condition  of  
foreign  citizens’  (Legislative Decree No. 286 of 25 July 1998), and its subsequent 
modifications and integrations (Law No. 189 of 30 July 2002, widely referred to as ‘Bossi-
Fini’; the so-called ‘Security Decree’ No. 92/2008 and a year later Law No. 94 of 15 July 
2009, better known as ‘Security Package’). The Security Package of 2009 introduced, for the 
first time in Italy, the so-called ‘crime of illegal immigration’, giving the irregular stay a new 
degree of illegality, in addition to the usual administrative expulsion measure (see Di Martino 
2013).  
 
Among others, it foresees the production of a residence permit as a requirement to benefit 
from certain services (healthcare and education are excluded from this) and for the purpose 
of concluding various acts of civil status, such as the recording of birth, death or recognition 
of the natural child (marriage, initially included, was deleted as a result of a judgment by the 
Constitutional Court); the extension of time required before one can apply for Italian 
citizenship by marriage (increased from 6 months to 2 years) and the extension of arrest 
duration for the alien who does not show the documents to the authorities (from 6 months to 
a year); the reduction from fourth to second degree of relationship necessary to prevent an 
irregular foreigner’s expulsion; imprisonment from 6 months to 3 years for anyone who rents 
property to an irregular foreigner; the obligation for operators of money transfer services to 
photocopy the residence  permits of their customers (and keep them for 10 years) and report 
to the police the customers without a permit. Furthermore, although since 1998 the annual 
flow Decrees provide ‘preferential quotas’ to the signatory States of readmission agreements 
(EMN 2009), Law 94/2009 introduces numerical restrictions on the flows of foreign workers 
coming from ‘countries not adequately cooperating in the fight against irregular migration, or 
in the readmission of their nationals who are subject to orders of removal’. 
 
As of March 2012 all foreigners applying for a first residence permit of more than a year’s 
duration had to sign an ‘integration contract’ and commit to acquire basic knowledge of the 
Italian language and civic principles. This is required within two or three years. Points may 
be lost for violation of terms, and if they reach zero the permit may not be renewed or an 
expulsion order issued. BY November 2012, 57,000 such agreements had been signed 
(EMN 2013). Moreover, since 2011 long-term residence permits have been granted only to 
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those who pass an Italian language test; by October 2011, 69,000 tests had been taken with 
a 70% pass rate (OECD 2012: 242). The impact of these policy changes on residence rights 
has not been evaluated, but clearly is likely to diminish security of legal residence for some. 
 
According to Law No 92 of 28 June 2012, the duration of the permit for ‘pending 
employment’ (attesa occupazione: issued to the third country national who wants to renew 
his permit, but would not comply with the residence condition because of unemployment, art. 
22 Consolidated Act) is extended from six months to a year. The permits can also be issued 
in case of turn up unavailability of the employer during the entry procedure with flows 
Decrees. It is not renewable, but it allows avoiding irregularity due to the connection between 
the residence permit and the employment, giving the alien further time to find a job and 
possibly ask for a new permit for work, and then interrupting the ‘pending employment’ 
permit. 
 
As for the reception of Directive 2009/52/CE, with Law No 109 of 16 July 2012 Italy 
introduced stiffer penalties for the employment of undocumented workers. In case of 
particularly exploitative working conditions, the Police Commissioner (Questore), on the 
proposal or with the approval of the Attorney General (Procuratore della Repubblica), can 
grant residence permits to foreigners who reported the fact and who cooperate in the penal 
proceeding against the employer. The stay permit issued ex art. 5 co.6 of the Consolidated 
Act (permit for humanitarian reasons) has a duration of six months, renewable for a year or 
for the length of the relevant proceedings, and allows to work. 
 
Asylum in Italy: mind the gap 
The number of recognised refugees in Italy in 2012 was 64,732, coupled with 14,625 asylum 
seekers (UNHCR Statistical Database). This is not only modest when compared to the total 
number of regular and irregular foreigners in the country, but also when measured against 
the situation in other large European countries, such as Germany, which hosts ten times as 
many refugees. The relative marginality of asylum seekers and refugees in Italy owes partly 
to the fact that the phenomenon is relatively new in the country. Until 1990, the country was 
only open for European asylum seekers. Italy then opened for receiving non-European 
asylum seekers, but during the following years the asylum procedure was disorganised and 
reception conditions poor. The turning point came in the second half of the decade, as in 
1997 the Dublin Convention came into effect, making Italy responsible for a much greater 
portion of asylum seekers entering the country. 
 
During the last decade, Italian authorities have responded to the measures towards a 
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common European asylum system by introducing initiatives and reforms to improve the 
asylum mechanism. However, the basic well-being of asylum seekers and refugees is far 
from properly secured. In 2010, Italy was condemned by the European Court of Human 
Rights for push back to Libya of people seeking protection. The most striking characteristic 
of the Italian asylum system is the lack of support, in terms of accommodation and 
integration, for the majority of asylum seekers and those granted a permit. The situation 
leaves thousands of people – including many considered vulnerable – without proper means 
for taking care of themselves. Asylum seekers waiting for the Commission are issued a 
temporary permit of three months (renewable till the asylum interview), which allows them to 
work only after six months of presence in the Italian territory without being heard by the 
asylum Commission. See Figure 2, below, for recent data on applications for asylum and 
international protection. 
 
Figure 2: Asylum applications in Italy: Number of applications, positive decisions, other 
protections, rejections (2008-2012) 
 
Source: Dossier Caritas/Migrantes 2013 
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2. Regularisation policies  
 
As previously noted, Italy over several decades has experienced considerable inflows of 
irregular labour migrants – primarily through visa overstaying and informal working. Entire 
economic sectors became niches for the informal employment of irregular and regular 
immigrants. Estimating the extent of the irregular immigrant presence is a difficult, if not 
impossible, task. Using an innovative sampling technique,3 Blangiardo and his colleagues at 
ISMU4 in Milan have been able to combine their own survey data with Istat official data, and 
estimate with some degree of credibility the extent of irregular immigrant stocks. Figure 3 
below shows the latest revised estimates of irregular stocks, since 1990. 
 
As is clearly visible, Italy’s stock of undocumented immigrant population fluctuates rapidly as 
a result of frequent regularisations and other policies of amnesty: the troughs occur in the 
periods immediately following such policies. The fitted trend line shows a rapid rise in stocks 
from the mid-1990s, peaking in 2007. Moreover, over the period 2000-2009 the fluctuations 
become increasingly wild; interpretation of this fluctuation is open to debate, but is related to 
one or both of regular immigrants losing their legal status and new inflows of undocumented 
immigrants. Given the increased immigrant stocks of this period, along with strong economic 
growth, the latter is probably more important. Since 2010, the economic crisis has impacted 
massively on both labour immigration and the structure of employment in Italy. Employment 
visas for 2011 and 2012 were only 90,843 and 52,328 (both less than pre-crisis levels) and 
the immigrant employment rate increased over the period 2008-2012. While Italian nationals’ 
employment was reduced by nearly one million, non- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3
 The ‘centre sampling technique’; see Baio et al. (2011) 
4
 Iniziative e Studi sulla Multiethnicità 
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Figure 3: Estimated stock of irregular immigrants in Italy, 1990-2012 
 
Source: data derived from ISMU (2013) 
 
nationals in employment increased from 1.75 to 2.3 million reaching 10% of the total labour 
force. In the highly segmented labour market of Italy, most of these new jobs were low-skill 
and/or part-time – and traditionally shunned by Italians (Caritas/Migrantes 2013). 
 
Figure 4 shows the estimated rate of irregularity of immigrants over the period 2003-2012, 
calculated as a proportion of total stock of immigrants and as a proportion of resident stock 
of immigrants (in both cases including the irregular component as included in the total). 
Although fluctuations are still visible, the large immigrant inflows over this period both 
dampen the swings and also result in a trend of decreasing irregularity rate. The fitted linear 
trend line shows a decrease of 10% (from 17% down to 7%) over a period of nine years. 
From 2009 onward, the fluctuations cease and are replaced by a shallow decline in the 
irregularity rate. This apparent stabilisation is the result of very small inflows and the linkage 
of employment with permit renewals: given that more (low-pay) work is available for 
immigrants, it is easier for them to renew short-term permits. There is also the fact that 55% 
of immigrants hold long-term residence permits – making renewal more or less automatic. 
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Figure 4: Estimated irregularity rate, 2003-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations from data in ISMU (2013) 
 
Irregular migration can be seen as a primary functional equivalent of legal labour migration in 
Italy (Salis 2012: 30ff) and the recognition of this role is reflected in the recurrent use of 
regularisation programmes, carried out by governments ruled by any political coalition. It has 
been argued that the peculiar element of the Italian case is exactly the systematic use of 
regularisations as a functional equivalent of an active labour migration policy (Barbagli, 
Colombo et al. 2004). These measures have traditionally accompanied periodical normative 
changes in migration laws and were typically presented as necessary to rebalance the 
situation. 
 
Amnesties (1986-2002) 
Minor regularisations were initially introduced in 1977 and 1982, though the major amnesties 
(sanatorie) started in 1986, when Italy enacted its first large-scale regularisation programme, 
regularising 105,000 migrant workers. This programme required migrants to have an 
employer sponsor and to have been in Italy prior to 27 January 1987. The programme has 
been criticised for having requirements that were too difficult to be met, leading to a low 
turnout of applicants in comparison to the numbers of irregular migrants who were probably 
already present.  
 
The 1990 regularisation programme was geared towards workers and students who had 
been living in Italy prior to 31 December 1989 and regularised 222,000 people. The majority 
of them (180,000) were regularised as job seekers, rather than as migrants with existing 
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employment. Then, a government decree regularised 246,000 foreign workers out of 
258,761 applications between 1995 and 1996. The requirements for this programme were 
stricter than those of previous programmes: applicants had to demonstrate that they had 
been living in Italy, employed during the past six months or have a job offer from an 
employer, and had paid three months of social welfare contributions. 
 
In 1998 there was a regularisation, offering a permit to all foreigners who could prove they 
were in the country on the date that the law took effect (16 October 1998) and also that they 
were irregularly employed. At first there were a limited number of permits available, but when 
the difference between available permits and applications increased, it was transformed into 
an actual amnesty. Overall, 217,000 regularisations were accepted out of 250,747 
applications (Baldwin-Edwards & Kraler 2009).  
 
The sixth and largest regularisation was carried out in 2002. Just after the enforcement of 
the Bossi-Fini law, the amnesty was open to domestic and care workers, and soon after 
extended to all other categories of workers. The outcome of that campaign has been the 
highest number of regularised migrants in the recent Italian migratory experience, that is 
almost 650,000 people (around 93% of the applications presented), half of which as 
domestic workers and caregivers (Salis 2012). The only ones entitled to present applications 
were Italian (or regularly resident foreigners) employers who had been employing irregular 
foreign workers during at least the three months preceding the opening of the application 
procedures. It was possible to regularise only dependent workers, either in standard or 
temporary employment. The applicants had to pay a lump sum of 290 Euros (for domestic 
workers) or 700 Euros (for all other categories) for each worker as a compensation for 
forgone fiscal and social welfare contributions. Irregular foreign workers who had previously 
received an expulsion order did not have in principle the possibility to regularise their 
position although subsequent implementing rules have opened the possibility to repeal the 
pending expulsion orders and gave some discretionary decision power to the Prefects, which 
are reported by some interviewed officials to have used it to a large extent (Salis 2012). 
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Amnesties (2009-2012) 
Differently from the past experiences, the 2009 regularisation scheme has been highly 
selective in its scope, only targeting irregular foreign workers in the personal and homecare 
services (sanatoria colf e badanti). It is worth mentioning the new provision on criminalisation 
of irregularity just approved in the same year, which would have had very serious 
consequences on the high number of migrant domestic workers with irregular status and 
consequently on their employers. The eligibility criteria for the regularisation were overall 
quite lax: native or EU nationals and non-EU long term residents could request the 
regularisation of up to 3 irregular migrant domestic workers living and working in Italy since 
at least 5 months; as for the income criteria, a minimum annual gross income of 25,000 Euro 
was required for the regularisation of housekeepers (colf) whereas no minimum income was 
required for those willing to regularise caregivers for elderly or disabled people (badanti): for 
this latter category the only requirement was the provision of an official certification attesting 
the disability and the need for constant assistance. In addition, a lump sum of 500 Euro had 
to be paid as a compensation for forgone social welfare contributions. An important point is 
that only employers could apply, therefore irregular immigrant workers were completely 
dependent on the preparedness of their employers to legalise their situation. 
 
A total of 294,744 applications was filed, 61% of which were for housekeepers and 39% for 
caregivers. Because of the unavailability of other effective mechanisms to regularise their 
status, however, many other migrant workers, who were not employed as carers or domestic 
workers and were not entitled to benefit from the measure, tried to find a way to benefit from 
it. While Eastern European nationals were mostly requested as caregivers, in line with what 
observed in official administrative data, workers of all other nationalities were mainly 
requested as housekeepers, for which eligibility criteria were less difficult to fulfill (Salis 
2012). Some migrant workers were helped by their employers, who declared that their 
migrant employees were working as carers or domestic workers. Many fell prey to 
unscrupulous ‘agencies’, ‘consultants’ and other individuals, both Italian and foreign, who 
cashed thousands of Euros, often borrowed from family and friends, to provide figurehead 
employers and sell fake documents (Amnesty International 2013). 
 
In Padova, the migrants who had reported cases of fraud enjoyed de facto toleration for 
about a year, as local authorities refrained from detaining and expelling them. In Massa 
Carrara, some of the migrants who reported cases of fraud were given a residence permit for 
‘justice reasons’. In Verona, prosecution authorities declared that each individual case would 
be examined to determine whether a residence permit for ‘social protection’ could be issued. 
In the majority of cases, no allegation of responsibility or complicity in the frauds was 
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formulated against the migrants, showing a recognition that they had been victims of a 
crime; at the same time, however, regularisation procedures were stopped and expulsion 
procedures initiated (Amnesty International 2013). 
 
Table 4, below, shows some broad characteristics of applications for the 2009 
regularisation.5 Some 37% of applications came from the North West region, with only 18% 
from the South and 5% from the islands. By broad area of geographical origin, applications 
concerned roughly 30% each from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. The two main 
nationalities were Ukrainians and Moroccans (at just over 12% each) followed by 
Moldovans, Chinese and Bangladeshi. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of applications for the 2009 regularisation, by regional area, 
geographical origin of the workers, and top five citizenships 
  % 
Regional area   
North West 37.4 
North East 18.1 
Centre 21.7 
South 18.0 
Islands 4.8 
Geographical 
origin   
Africa 29.7 
Asia 32.1 
E. Europe 28.0 
S. America 10.0 
Major 
nationalities   
Ukraine 12.6 
Morocco 12.2 
Moldova 8.7 
China 7.4 
Bangladesh 6.3 
          Source: EMN (2012: 67) 
                                                        
5
 Data relating to final outcomes of the procedure have not been made available; provisional data are also 
insufficiently detailed as not to be worth reproducing. As of 10 October 2011, 276,750 applications had been 
processed with 233,244 grants of permits. 
16 
 
 
 
The 2012 regularisation 
Following the reception of the Directive 2009/52/CE, a new regularisation was announced in 
2012, when 134,576 applications were filed, among which were 86% domestic workers 
(Censis 2013). The number of applications is low, considering that 300,000 potential 
regularisations were envisaged. The eligibility criteria were: Italian/EU nationals or non-EU 
long term resident employer; irregular migrant present in Italy since 31 December 2011 and 
working since at least 3 months; not less than 30,000 Euro income of the employer. In 
addition, a lump sum of 1,000 euros had to be paid, as well as social contributions for the 
whole period of employment and however not less than 6 months. 
 
Article 18: permit for social protection 
One regularisation mechanisms is foreseen by Italian legislation. In compliance with article 
18 of the Consolidated Act (Decree Law no. 286/1998) foreign nationals who find 
themselves in situations of violence, confinement and severe exploitation on Italian territory 
can receive a residence permit for reason of social protection. From 2000 to 2012, 21,795 
victims of trafficking (among which 1,171 minors) have benefited from integration 
programmes ex art.18 (Caritas/Migrantes 2013).  
 
Article 18 provides the possibility to obtain a six-month residence permit which can be 
renewed for up to 18 months. The permit can be obtained through two different channels. 
The first one foresees a collaboration between the applicant and the law enforcement: a 
denunciation (denuncia) against someone accused of exploiting, abusing and profiting from 
the applicants’ stay in Italy has to be made by the applicant. The second channel goes 
through the social services of the local councils and NGOs. In this case, it is up to the 
General Headquarter of the Internal Police (Questura) of each province to decide if the 
residence permit should be available with or without a denunciation. As a matter of fact, the 
first channel is the most prevailing. Applicants are in both cases obliged to participate in 
protection and reintegration programs of NGOs, offered in different degrees: legal, medical, 
material and financial assistance, counseling, education/job training as well as assistance in 
finding employment. The participation in the programs gives access to the social services 
and educational institutions, as well as to the State’s employment bureau, enabling the 
possible transformation of the permit for social protection into a residence permit for 
employment, with the requirement of a halftime employment contract. 
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In 2003, another article was introduced, making it easier to include men in the programs of 
protection and integration. In previous years, there were situations of exploitation where it 
was not possible to apply article 18 due to its strict focus on exploitation linked to (female) 
prostitution. The introduction of article 13 facilitates the application of article 18, moving 
beyond exploitation linked to prostitution to also cover situations of violence, segregation and 
submission due to the condition of irregularity. Nowadays, the two articles are often 
combined (article 13 for the first three months of a program and then article 18) (Johansson 
2012). 
 
Postponement of removal order (toleration) 
Article 19 of the Consolidated Act foresees three cases in which removal/expulsion of 
foreigners is temporarily forbidden: 
- Minors (they cannot be expelled until they reach maturity unless it is to follow an 
expelled parent); 
- Pregnancy, or after giving birth within the past six months (the postponement is 
extended to the husband after decision No 376/2000 of the Italian Constitutional 
Court to protect the unity of the family); and 
- Serious illness and under treatment (they cannot be expelled until their treatment is 
completed). 
-  
In these cases, according to art. 28 of the Implementation Decree No 394/1999, a stay 
permit for humanitarian reasons is issued to the third-country nationals, giving them legal 
stay status and rights comparable to other regular migrants. The Decree does not foresee 
the duration of these permits or their renewal. There is no prohibition that third-country 
nationals holding this type of permit cannot apply for a normal permit for work or study or 
other reasons as long as it is in line with policy provisions (European Commission 2013). 
 
The ‘quota system’: a yearly informal regularisation mechanism 
Admission of non-EU foreign workers is subject to a mechanism of quantitative selectivity 
based on the determination of ceilings to new entries on a yearly basis. Quotas are therefore 
the main policy tool designed and implemented with the goal of opening a legal entry 
channel for working purposes. They are meant to regulate the admission of third country 
nationals and their access to Italian labour market, by combining a purely quantitative 
selectivity with some elements of qualitative selectivity, distinguish between different 
occupational sectors and countries of origin (EMN 2010). The main responsibility for the 
determination of annual quotas of new inflows is given to the government (and in particular 
to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labour), which sets up the quota, through a 
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Prime Minister Decree (so called Decreto Flussi). Quotas have to be set in accordance to 
the principles and general criteria stated in the Document of Migration Policy Planning 
(DMPP). This Document has to be adopted every three years after a process of in-depth 
consultation of the relevant stakeholders and authorities, in particular: the involved 
ministries, relevant parliamentary committees, the Regional and Local Authorities, the 
National Council of Economy and Labour (CNEL, a high-level independent advisory body 
established by the Constitution), the main NGOs active in the assistance and integration of 
migrants, as well as trade unions and employers’ organizations. However, the adoption of 
the DMPP has proven to be a quite burdensome task and its contents much too general to 
adequately and effectively orient migratory policies. As a matter of fact, only the first two 
DMPP for the period 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 have been produced without delay, while 
the DMPP for the period 2004-2006 was only adopted at mid-2005 and after that no other 
Document has been adopted. Thus, the planning of quotas worked till 2005, although it was 
already ‘purely ritualistic’, as Sciortino (1999: 243) argues. In the case where the DMPP is 
not published, the President of the Council of Ministers is able to provide an interim decree 
within the ceilings of the previous year’s quotas, and this is how it has been done since then. 
In the most recent years, quotas for entries were 170,000 non-seasonal workers for 2007 
and 150,000 non-seasonal workers for 2008, while 80,000 seasonal workers for 2009.  
 
With regard to the 2006 quota, it must be noted that the 170,000 new entries for work 
originally planned by the flows decree, passed by the Cabinet Decree of 02/15/06, were 
increased through another 350,000 additional job positions (established by the new Cabinet 
Decree of 25/10/06) to cover all of the approximately 500,000 applications presented in 
March 2006 at the first decree and those further advanced by 21 July of the same year. This 
can be considered as a de facto amnesty.6 
 
Recently, the Consolidated Act was amended by law 25/2010, according to which 
transitional programming must refer to the last issued decree. Therefore, in 2010 there was 
a transitional programming of entry quotas for seasonal (80,000) and non-seasonal workers 
(98,080). Among the non-seasonal employments, which were implemented in the following 
year, 52,080 were reserved for countries which had signed cooperation agreements on 
migration matters, 30,000 for other countries (but these were restricted to the domestic field), 
11,000 for the conversion of stay permits, and 4,000 were assigned to workers who had 
completed training programmes abroad. Quotas for seasonal employments were lowered 
down to 60,000 in 2011 and to 35,000 in 2012, when there were no quotas for subordinate 
                                                        
6
 See Blangiardo (2007: 41-42). 
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work. In 2013, there were 30,000 seasonal workers, among which 5,000 workers who have 
already been employed for two consecutive seasons. 
On one hand, the quota system of flow decrees has been structured in a selective manner, 
since a great many of the authorised slots are reserved for migrants from countries with 
which Italy has stipulated bilateral agreements. On the other hand, the system has 
increasingly come to be structured in a manner reminiscent of the old Gastarbeiter model, 
clearly encouraging entries for seasonal work rather than for permanent employment. Legal 
entry remains anchored to this system of annual entry quotas, which in the last years have 
been improperly used as ‘mini-amnesties’ to rectify situations of previous irregularity. The 
intent to use the flows decrees to regularise migrant workers already present in the country 
had become very clear (Zincone 2011), and quotas can be seen as informal regularisation 
mechanism part of the regular migration policy, running almost every year. 
 
Emergency North Africa, a de facto toleration 
In the midst of an escalating influx of irregular migrants from Tunisia to Italy, on 5 April 2011 
Italy and Tunisia signed an ‘exchange of notes.’ This agreement set concrete measures to 
prevent irregular arrivals in Italy and to repatriate Tunisian nationals arriving in the country. 
According to the Italian Decree of the President of the Council of Ministries ‘Emergency 
North Africa - Humanitarian measures for citizens from North Africa’, Tunisian migrants who 
landed in Italy between 1 January and 5 April 2011 were granted temporary protection status 
ex art. 20 of the Consolidated Act providing for ‘Extraordinary reception measures for 
exceptional events’. Conversely, Tunisians arriving in Italy after 5 April 2011 would be 
returned to Tunisia. The permits were valid for six months (then renewed for other six 
months) and grant the holder the possibility to work and also travel throughout the Schengen 
area. Some countries like France and Germany as well as the EU Commission have raised 
concerns about the validity of these permits in the Schengen area. 
 
This ad hoc regularisation measure, clearly without the intention of regularising Tunisian 
nationals for them to stay in Italy, from the perspective of the Italian authorities would allow 
the permit holders to move freely within the Schengen area, and presumably to France. It 
was a self-interested way for Italy to unilaterally activate the temporary protection instrument 
that the European institutions were reluctant to utilise. 
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3. Impact of regularisation on the labour market outcomes of  
      regularised immigrants 
 
3.1 Review of existing studies 
 
The earliest research on regularisations in Italy, including post-legalisation trajectories, is 
that undertaken by Emilio Reyneri concerning the 1996 regularisation. In fact, even before 
the survey research, ISTAT (1998) had estimated that a third of migrants legalized in 1991 
had failed to renew their residence permits two years later. Moreover, Reyneri estimates – 
on the basis of surveys conducted in 1993-4 – that some 15% of applications for the 1996 
programme were based on false labour contracts. Among the regularised migrants, only 3% 
had permanent contracts, 11% were unemployed, and 86% had mere offers of employment 
(Reyneri 2001: 50). 
 
After the regularisation in 1996, he suggested three typical sequences that reflect the wide 
range of labour market situations of applicants (based on survey work conducted in the 
Milan area). The first (and ideal situation) was where the employer paid the necessary social 
security contributions for a worker in a steady employment relationship; typically, the 
employee would remain in the same job, with the same conditions except that he would now 
be legally employed and registered within the social security system. The second category 
concerned workers whose employers refused to make the social security payments 
necessary for the application, and obliged the workers to pay them. In these cases, the 
workers tended to abandon their jobs (since the employers were clearly unprepared to pay 
the higher labour costs) and sought alternative employment. The third category concerned 
those persons engaged in informal activities such as street-selling and odd jobs. In order to 
participate in the regularisation, they had to present a work contract. Those who presented a 
fake contract, typically continued with their original activities after legalization; on the other 
hand, those who arranged a real job and contract specifically for the regularisation, tended 
not to return to street selling – even if they returned to irregular employment. A small number 
of persons engaged in casual employment (but not street selling) succeeded in managing 
the transition to formal employment, despite presenting fake employment contracts (Reyneri 
1999: 99-101). Based on unemployment register data, Reyneri (2001: 50) estimates that a 
third of regularised migrants lost their jobs within a few months, returning to unemployment 
and/or informal activity. 
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A government-funded research programme investigating the employment trajectories of 
immigrants after the large 2002 regularisation was carried out by Fondazione ISMU in 
partnership with partners in Campania and Bari. 7  The project utilized application data 
provided by government agencies, a 2005 survey of 30,000 foreign workers across Italy 
(22,000 in 30 provinces classed as EU Objective 1, and 8,000 in ten provinces of the Centre-
North) selected so as to provide statistically significant results to enable construction of an 
overall national result.8 This survey was followed by semi-structured interviews with 1,400 
employers who had submitted applications in 2002.  
 
The survey (conducted three years after the regularisation programme) found that 28% of 
those immigrants sampled had been regularised in 2002. Three groups of migrants were 
identified – always-regular migrants prior to 2002, migrants regularised in 2002, and irregular 
migrants. The proportions of these groups varied between North and South: for the total 
sample, only 11.2% were irregular, while in the South the proportion was 18.9%. Over 98% 
of those regularised had been able to keep their status, and in 88.5% of cases the 
beneficiaries of an annual permit for dependent employment had been able to renew their 
permits with either the original employer or a new one. Migrants regularised with dependent 
employment contracts in 2002 had a high proportion (15%) becoming either unemployed or 
working irregularly, in comparison with 11% of immigrants regular before 2002. 
Unemployment particularly affected sub-Saharan Africans (14%), and North Africans as well 
as South Americans (both 11%). 
 
Post-regularisation, migrants had higher incomes than irregular migrants, but lower than 
regular migrants – not justified by seniority levels.9 Considerable income differences are 
noted according to gender (€1,000 male cf. €743 female) and region (€928 Centre North cf. 
€619 South). Policy conclusions that the study’s authors reach are of some interest. First, 
they note the lack of a continuous regularisation mechanism, with complete reliance on 
extraordinary regularisation measures. Secondly, they express concern about the short 
duration of permits (6 months for those acting without their employers’ consent; one year as 
a norm). Thirdly, they note the dependence of legal status on possession of a stable 
employment position, which (pre-crisis) looked to be untenable with the increasing 
segmentation and volatility of the Italian labour market (Cesareo 2007: 85-6).  
 
                                                        
7
 The extensive research programme’s results are reported in Italian in five volumes, in a cased edition of Il 
Mezzogiorno dopo la grande regolarizzazione, Milan: Franco Angeli, 2006. A summary is contained, in English, in 
Cesareo (2007), which forms the basis of our own synopsis here. 
8
 For sampling methodology, see Baio et al. (2011). 
9
 €851 on average, compared with irregular incomes of €690 and regular of €965. 
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Analysis of the characteristics of those participating in the 2002 regularisation is contained in 
a study undertaken by Blangiardo and Tanturri (2004). 
 
Carfagna et al. (2008) have also undertaken a detailed examination of the impact of the 
2002 regularisation programme, using permit databases for the period 2004-06 to study the 
migration paths of those regularised. Their methodology consisted of record linkage between 
residence permit data, for the three years 2004, 2005 and 2006. With eight variables 
(birthdate, sex, nationality, civil status, municipality of residence; permit reason, issue date, 
expiry date) they analysed between 2.23 million and 2.42 million permits for each year.  Of 
the 647,000 regularised in 2002, 505,000 remained in possession of a valid permit by early 
2007 (a decline of 21.9%). Owing to the limitations of the methodology, the decline cannot 
be precisely attributed to specific causes: these include acquisition of Italian citizenship, 
departure from Italy, and return to an irregular status. It is presumed that the majority consist 
of those in the third category. 
 
The greatest decline in valid permits was found to be in the South, only partly explained by 
internal migration from South to North-West. By nationality, the most stable were citizens of 
Albania, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Moldova, Ukraine, Morocco, Egypt, China and Japan. The 
greatest relative declines in permits were shown by those from Russia and Tunisia (>40%), 
Nigeria and Bulgaria (>30%) and the largest absolute declines lay with those from Ecuador 
(-26.4%) and Peru (-27.3%). In terms of employment trajectories, although 85.5% retained a 
permit for dependent work, transitions to other employment types were significant. These 
included 7.4% in self-employment, 5.2% for family reasons, and 1.4% for unemployment. 
The shift to self-employment (which can be seen as upward mobility) concerned 
predominantly males, and by nationality those communities already extensively engaged in 
self-employment (Chinese, Senegalese and Moroccans). 
 
Several important conclusions are drawn. First, 80% of regularised immigrants were still 
regular three years after receiving their permit. Secondly, over the period under study 
important changes occurred as a consequence of regularisation: these included being able 
to marry and also changes in professional status. Thirdly, the actual circumstances of 
regularisation (e.g. with fake contracts) impact on employment trajectory and its meaning; 
official data cannot provide information on this issue. Fourthly, the territorial mobility of 
regularised persons proved to be exceptionally high – 60% moved to another province, and 
40% to another territorial area. These rates are higher than both Italians and always-regular 
immigrants. The move is predominantly South-North. Finally, differences by nationality, 
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gender and place were noted; however, these administrative data give only partial answers 
to relevant questions, and more sources of data are needed. 
 
In addition to general studies, there also exist two nationality-specific empirical studies of 
migrant groups – in Italy generally (Obućina 2013) and in Naples (Harney 2012). Obućina 
makes a study of the occupational trajectories of Senegalese immigrants in Spain, Italy and 
France. The data used are from the Senegalese sample of the MAFE10 dataset. In a detailed 
analysis, the author shows that the conventional U-shaped occupational cost of migration 
pertains, but has not disappeared even after 15 years of stay in Europe. After five years, 
only one quarter of the sample had experienced upward mobility relative to their first year. 
Education acquired in Europe (but not from the home country) is associated with upward 
occupational mobility. Thirdly, possession of a work permit substantially increased 
occupational mobility, and lack of its possession was associated with low attainment.  Other 
relevant conclusions are that there was little evidence of differences between the three 
countries, when measured with destination country dummies; that men showed greater 
occupational mobility (both up and down) while women suffered a higher occupational cost 
of migration. Host country language skills were also associated with access to better 
employment. 
 
Harney (2012) over the period 2004-08 undertook 18 months of ethnographic observation 
and participation in migrant networks of Ukrainians in Naples. He notes that previous studies 
estimated the irregularity rate of Ukrainians in Naples as being 32%, while for Ukrainians 
across Italy it was 23.4%. In individual case studies, he finds that employers’ refusal to pay 
social security contributions (and even to refuse to pay wages) is a common feature. Another 
feature of employers’ behaviour11 consisted of giving a contract of employment just before 
expiry of the immigrant’s residence permit. In this way, the actual employment could then 
revert to an informal one such that the employer could avoid paying taxes and insurance. 
Even so, the benefits of legal status were evident to most immigrants. He concludes that 
informal employment is a serious social challenge for all immigrant groups, but strong social 
networks created by the Ukrainians in Naples has given them a higher degree of security 
than for other groups, such as African males. 
 
                                                        
10
 MAFE (Migrations between Africa and Europe) is an EU-funded research project previously funded by French 
state agencies (see http://www.mafeproject.com/). The part of the project dealing with Senegalese migration has 
complex and extensive sampling of Senegalese migrants, non-migrants and return migrants. 600 immigrants in 
Spain, Italy and France were interviewed, along with 1,000 non-migrants and 70 return migrants in Senegal. In 
Spain, along with snowball sampling, probability sampling was used with the Padrón Municipal as a 
sampleframe. Quota sampling was used in Italy and Spain, as there was no comparable dataset to draw from.  
11
 We should emphasise here that ‘employers’ in the case of East Europeans in Naples are almost always 
households, since the predominant economic activity of immigrants in Naples is in domestic and caring duties. 
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Finally, we need to mention the highly important work of the Fondazione ISMU in conducting 
annual surveys in Milan and Lombardy, national surveys since 2004, and in 2009 two 
national surveys:  a labour path survey and an integration measure oriented survey. The 
regional surveys have a sample size of up to 9,000; the 2004 national survey a size of 
34,000,the labour path survey of 16,000 and the integration measure oriented of 12,000.12 
They also conduct various other one-off and focused surveys. Some of their research has 
already been discussed above, and estimations of irregular presence made by ISMU are 
used in section 2 (above). In a recent study of immigrants in Lombardy (Riva & Zanfrini 
2013), using ISMU data the authors show a clear pattern of distinct periods. Over 2001-
2007, the labour market outcomes for immigrants improved – an increase in employment 
rates of 12%, a fall in the unemployment rate from 13% to 6%, and a decline in irregular 
employment from 19% to 16.5%. This improvement they attribute to the 2002 regularisation 
and an overall favourable economic situation. In the subsequent period of economic crisis, 
they note a drop of about 5% in both activity and employment rates, a doubling of the 
unemployment rate (from 6% to 11.7%) and a strongly reduced incidence of irregular 
working (from 16.5% down to 9.8%). 
 
 
3.2 Results from the feasibility study 
 
Interviews were carried out in Milan and Naples, following semi-structured guidelines. In 
each city, 10 interviews were undertaken – 6 with immigrants previously regularised, and 4 
with irregular immigrants. Their dates of entry into Italy ranged from 1995 to 2011; most (17) 
had entered as tourists and overstayed; two had entered illegally; and one applied for 
political asylum. The age range is from 24 to 50. The migrants selected in the two cities are 
broadly representative of the different local immigrant community presences with irregular 
status. In Naples, the community is predominantly East European, Sri Lankan and African; in 
Milan, the Philippine and South American presence is strong, along with North Africans 
(mainly Egyptians). The educational level ranges from primary to college degree (4 persons), 
with 5 interviewees in Naples possessing a technical diploma. Table 5, below, gives a 
synopsis of the principal variables collected in the course of the interviews. 
 
Of those who had successfully regularised, five participated in the large 2002 regularisation 
programme, one in the 1996 programme, and three through the 2006 flow decree. Two had 
applied with fake contracts, and another two had changed their passports to hide previous 
                                                        
12
 Interview with Gian Carlo Blangiardo, 21 May 2013. 
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irregular work and apply under a flow decree. All but one of the irregular migrants in Milan 
had applied unsuccessfully for one or more regularisations (paying up to 4,000 euros for 
fake contracts) which had been rejected for employer inadequacies. One person, who 
arrived with a family reunification permit, lost his legal status after 8 years, owing to 
unemployment. Four people in Milan and one in Naples possessed a long term permit; one 
had acquired Italian citizenship through marriage. 
 
 Perhaps surprisingly, the relationship between employment and legal statuses is weak: of 
those with legal status, only three were in full-time employment, five were in part-time 
working arrangements, and four were inactive or unemployed. Contrariwise, of those without 
legal documentation, four were in full-time employment, two in part-time work, and two were 
unemployed. Most of the respondents were working in the services sector as domestic 
workers or  
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Table 5: synopsis of interview results 
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cleaners (4), caregivers (3) or restaurant workers (1); three were employed in building and 
construction (of which two were undocumented) and one each in seasonal agriculture, 
interpreting services and casual labour for an advertising agency. Several of those with legal 
status but poorly paid part-time employment were doing additional informal work to 
supplement their income. 
 
The effects of regularisation were generally reported as positive: two people reported a 
doubling of their pay rates, whereas six considered the financial gain to be slight and the 
access to healthcare and a secure legal status to be more important. Two respondents 
considered that the impact was negligible, and little security is afforded by 2-year residence 
permits that have to be renewed.  
 
The reasons for coming to Italy were predominantly friends or relatives resident there (12 
people), of which two Sri Lankans’ mothers had been resident in Naples for several 
decades. Two people came specifically to benefit from regularisation programmes (2002 and 
2009), two decided spontaneously as tourists to remain in Italy as overstayers, two had 
informal employment arranged in advance, one had France as his destination but decided to 
stay in Milan, and one applied for political asylum. 
 
 
Individual case studies 
Case IT-1-5 Milan 
A male Egyptian national aged 43 with a permanent residence permit, currently labour 
market inactive through illness (hepatitis). Highest educational level is high school; he has 
limited ability in the Italian language. He has resided in Egypt since 2000, and has a wife 
and four children in Egypt. In June 2013 he was granted the right of family reunification and 
his wife and children should be joining him in Italy in late 2013. 
 
On arrival in Italy in 2000, for four months he was without work. With the help of an Egyptian 
friend, he found work without legal contract in a construction company. He applied under the 
2002 amnesty, with the assistance of the company that employed him (they filled in all the 
forms in Italian, as he could not write or speak Italian). After 4 months, he was granted a 2-
year residence permit and retained his job (at a higher salary) in the same company. In 2008 
he obtained a permanent residence permit. In 2010 the company went bankrupt and he has 
been unemployed since.  
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His perception of regularisation is that it was a simple process and very important for 
avoiding the exploitation of immigrant workers and for access to medical care. He is very 
grateful for medical coverage, since he is now an invalid with hepatitis C, awaiting a liver 
transplant. He receives 250 euros a month from the INPS and another 250 euros from his 
family in Egypt. He is living off the savings he made over the last decade. When he recovers 
from his illness, he intends to return to the labour market. 
 
Case IT-1-10 Milan 
A male Tunisian national aged 39, with a 2-year permit, resident since 2003. Educational 
level: completed secondary. He has a wife and a 3-year old child living in Tunisia. 
 
He arrived as an illegal entrant (by boat) in 2003, intending to travel to France. Instead, 
friends in Italy found work for him as a bricklayer, for 10 hours a week. He worked for the 
same company until 2006. When the 2006 decree law was passed, he applied with a fake 
contract and employer – paying 10,000 euros for this service. In late 2007 he was granted a 
2-year permit. Seemingly, he continued to work (presumably now documented) for the 
construction company and was able to renew his permit in 2009. In 2011 the company went 
bankrupt, and he was unemployed June-December 2011. He was unable to renew his 
residence permit in late 2011, so he made a fake employment contract for this purpose, 
paying 3,000 euros. In 2012, he found a part-time job (20 hours a week) in a cleaning 
company; his financial situation is not good, because he is paid only 5 euros an hour (400 
euros a month). However, he is happy with his colleagues and employer. 
 
He has been able to repay debts in Tunisia and send remittances to his family, with the 
previous employment. Currently, he is looking for a job with better pay. 
 
Case IT-2-6 Naples 
A male Sri Lankan aged 32, legally resident for the period 2000-2008 but now irregular. 
Educational level: secondary education until 16. Good command of both Italian and the 
Neapolitan dialect. He is currently unemployed and single. 
 
Aged 18, he arrived in Italy in 2000 with his father, to join his mother who had been living in 
Naples since 1980. He had in advance a work contract arranged by his mother, and 
received a 2-year residence permit. (Presumably this was a fake contract). He found work in 
a vintage wine store, for the first two years without contract and then for 4 years with one. 
His pay was 800 euros a month. In 2006 he had a serious traffic accident while delivering 
goods (his motorcycle fell under a car) and damaged his knee. He was no longer able to 
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carry heavy weights, and had to quit his employment, receiving 2,000 euros in redundancy 
pay.  
 
In 2007, he found informal work as a carer for the elderly; his employer died after 6 months. 
He undertook another caring job, but the old man died after only 4 months. He then 
registered as unemployed and received a residence permit for 6 months, allowing job-
search. The permit expired in 2008 and he has found only informal odd jobs. He explains 
that he could not apply for the 2012 regularisation because he could not afford the cost – 
1,000 euro fee plus social insurance contributions. Both his parents returned to Sri Lanka; 
neither has any pension, and they live off some savings accrued during their decades in 
Italy. He wishes to remain in Italy (specifically Naples, because of greater police tolerance of 
sans papiers), despite a bad situation with occasional informal employment and no 
healthcare coverage. He currently shares a small apartment with two Sri Lankan friends, one 
of whom is also unemployed. 
 
Case IT-1-9 Naples 
A female Ukrainian national aged 46, with a 2-year permit, resident since 2005. Educational 
level: nursing diploma. Cohabiting/married with TCN legal partner. 
 
She arrived with a 10-day tourist visa in 2005 with advance information about irregular 
employment opportunities through social networks, and with the intention of staying only a 
few years. She had previously worked as a nurse in a Russian hospital. One day after 
arrival, she started working as a live-in carer for an elderly lady, who needed much 
assistance. Despite a strong emotional bond with the old lady, she quit the job in 2007 as 
the family refused to regularise her employment. She immediately found employment as a 
domestic and nanny for a family, which allowed her to live out; she remains working for this 
family today. 
 
She had been following the legal situation and taking advice from knowledgeable persons, 
including immigrant support agencies, about the possibilities for regularisation. She 
managed to persuade her reluctant employer to give her a regular contract, and utilized the 
provisions of the 2009 flux decree law to be recruited from Russia. She was assisted by the 
‘Felice di Napoli’ agency which helped her with the forms and procedure and also with 
release of a new passport when she returned to Russia. (For reasons that are not clear, she 
and other Ukrainians typically request replacement passports when regularising – in this 
case, twice.) With a year’s delay, in 2010 she obtained a 2-year residence permit valid for 
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work, and was able to renew it in 2012. She continues working for the same family for 36 
hours a week. 
 
Since 2007, she has cohabited with a 50 year old Ukrainian man; he regularised under the 
2009 law in the same way, with her assistance and that of her employer. They were 
scheduled to be married in Ukraine in August 2013, and have plans to return there 
permanently within a few years. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The difficulties of surveying immigrants – both regular and irregular – in the Italian labour 
market have largely been solved by previous researchers associated with ISMU. The 
selection of the two cities of Milan and Naples is ideal: the former is the largest locus of 
immigrants in Italy, mainly for economic reasons; Naples is appropriate, as the locus of 
rather different immigrant groups with a difficult labour market relationship – primarily in the 
informal economy.  The selection of appropriate interviewees for our feasibility study reflects 
the different characteristics of immigrants in these two urban centres. Extrapolating from 
these two regions to the whole of Italy is not an easy task – but again, our partner ISMU has 
been a pioneer, in collaboration with state statistical agencies and others, in managing such 
a feat. 
 
One of the difficulties in constructing any sort of longitudinal survey is the very high mobility 
of migrants in Italy – particularly after being regularised. This mobility is primarily South to 
North, and is a large part of the explanation for the small immigrant communities in the 
South and the large presence in the North. This internal migration has been studied in some 
depth, and is even present in state demographic statistical calculations. 
 
The declining rate of irregularity in Italy (along with its mirror, of increasing legal security of 
the immigrant population) presents a challenge for constructing a counterfactual. The 
probability is that there is not a large enough community of always-irregular to use as a 
control group: even if they can be located, their characteristics are unlikely to be suitable. In 
particular, their duration of residence is typically very short and they tend to move abroad or 
return to their country of origin at times of crisis. 
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Finally, as in all of the countries of the European South, economic conditions have had a 
terrible impact on labour markets. The most dramatic effect in Italy has been on the native 
population’s employment (or unemployment) levels; in the case of immigrants, the impact 
has been rather different. Restructured labour markets have recently favoured part-time, 
low-skill and low-pay work; this is where immigrants have been located traditionally, and 
their employment rates have benefited greatly from the crisis. On the other hand, incomes 
have been cut as hours and therefore remuneration have been reduced. Equally, there 
seems to be an increasingly common pattern of mixing informal and formal employment, to 
maximise household income. These trends are of great importance, and affect not only 
immigrants. The research design has to accommodate the sheer complexity of highly 
segmented labour markets in both crisis and flux. 
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